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ABSTRACT 
Deregulation is the only means possible of revitalizing the Japanese economy 
which has been suffering the longest recession following the bubble economy. One 
recent attempt to deregulate the system involved the privatization and integration of 
special government corporations, including those belonging to the Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Program (FILP). The FILP was established in 1953 to provide a financial basis for 
government intervention into the market to achieve particular policy objectives such as 
distributing funds for public investment to build infrastructure or promote economic 
growth. It should be noted, however, that the current size of the FILP in terms of 
budget is almost the same as the general account of the national budget. Moreover, the 
share of funds related to the FILP in terms of money flow in the economy is about 43%, 
which used to be 20% in the 1970s. This growing involvement of government in 
financial activities is said to be suppressing the private sector. This is the reason why the 
reform of the FILP is a major issue. 
After the oil crises when the Japanese economy underwent structural change 
from a high to a low growth rate, the flow of money and funds was also affected, and the 
FILP also underwent a great change. But nowadays a real change might be necessary 
for the FILP; that is, as deregulation of the financial market proceeds and the market 
mechanism increasingly moves into motion, the role of the government is expected to 
decrease. This paper will analyze the role of financial activities of the government, and 
examine why the FILP faces reform, and how it should be deregulated by considering the 
economic foundation of the FILP as well as its relation with the transformation of the 
Japanese economy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of the longest recession following the bubble economy, it is commonly 
understood that deregulation is the only means possible of revitalizing the Japanese economy. 
One attempt to deregulate the system involved the privatization and integration of special 
government corporations, including those belonging to the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Program (FILP). This reform, just as a number of other reforms implemented from time to 
time, disappeared in the "Bermuda Triangle" of the Japanese economy — "zoku-giin" 
(politicians with special interests) of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), bureaucrats, and the 
agricultural cooperatives (nokyo) — without holding any discussion as to whether those special 
government agencies are even necessary in this age when Japan is recognized as a major 
economic power, and economic globalization is taking place. This led to a political 
showdown which motivated the government to take concrete measures towards deregulation. 
The aftermath of the political decision-making is that among ninety-two special government 
corporations, ten have been integrated and only one agency abolished — the Social 
Development Research Institute with twenty-three staff. Teito Rapid Transit Authority is to be 
privatized in a few years. It is thus doubtful how this reform will contribute towards trimming 
down the number of employees and government subsidies, which amounted to ¥2.8 trillion in 
1995. 
The aims of this reform of special government corporations is to transform the economy 
to becoming more market oriented, to reduce resources such as tax money to be allocated to 
the public sector, and to encourage revealing more information on these agents. The reform 
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of the FILP also has the same objective. The current size of the FILP in terms of budget is 
almost the same as the general account of the national budget. Moreover, the share of funds 
related to the FILP in terms of money flow in the economy is about 43%, which used to be 20% 
in the 1970s. This growing involvement of government in financial activities is said to be 
suppressing the private sector. This is the reason why the reform of the FILP is a major 
issue. Actually, there are four agents which comprise the FILP among the government 
agents to be reformed, as mentioned earlier. 
This paper will analyze why the FILP faces such reform, and how it should be 
deregulated by considering the economic foundation of the FILP as well as its relation with the 
transformation of the Japanese economy. The FILP was established in 1953 to provide a 
financial basis for government intervention into the market to achieve particular policy 
objectives such as distributing funds for public investment to build infrastructure or promote 
economic growth. After the oil crises when the Japanese economy underwent structural 
change from a high to a low growth rate, the flow of money and funds was also affected, and 
the FILP also underwent a great change. But nowadays a real change might be necessary for 
the FILP; that is, as deregulation of the financial market proceeds and the market mechanism 
increasingly moves into motion, the role of the government is expected to decrease. This 
paper also examines the role of financial activities of the government in this situation, and 
provides the microeconomic foundations of the FILP. 
In section 2 which follows, an outline of the FILP is provided, and the flow of funds 
related to the program is described. The role of the government in the economy is next 
examined in section 3. Theoretical issues of the FILP related to deregulation are discussed in 
section 4. A brief conclusion is given in the final section. 
2. THE SYSTEM OF THE FILP 
The FILP is a general name for government activities related to the finance and 
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investment of public funds. } It consists of two aspects: (a) one is the function of collecting 
public funds through the government-operated postal savings system such as postal savings, 
and postal life insurance and postal annuity, and (b) the other is that of allocating those funds to 
various investment institutions which invest public funds into specific fields of the economy. 
The total amount of funds related to this program is so huge, almost half of the national budget, 
that this program is sometimes referred to as "the second national budget". 
The flow of funds related to the FILP is shown in figure 1. The FILP is rather 
complicated so focus will be placed on the source of funds and their distribution. 
2.1. Source of Funds for the Program 
The main source of funds is the Trust Fund Bureau fund managed by the Ministry of 
Finance.2) This fund consists of postal savings deposits, and funds of national and welfare 
pensions. Postal savings are deposits made at post offices, and all premium of the postal life 
insurance and postal annuity are also important sources for the program. The program also 
raises funds from private financial institutions by issuing bonds which are guaranteed by the 
government. Finally, funds come from tax revenues through the general budget, more 
precisely, through the industrial investment special account, etc The share of those funding 
sources of the fund to the program is shown in figure 2. Figure 3 indicates the share of the 
Trust Fund Bureau fund, which has the largest share in the program. 
The two figures imply that postal savings has been the biggest source of funds for the 
program. Its share increased after the mid-1960s, but from the oil crises of the 1970s until 
1980, no change in share was observed. However, after 1980, the share of postal savings has 
continued to show a decrease. Since postal savings is a voluntary as well as stable means of 
savings for consumers, it is worthy to note that the program has been founded upon the high 
savings rate of Japanese households. In the 1990s because of the crisis faced by private banks, 
which is symbolized by the so-called Jusen problem, postal savings has shown a marked 
increase. 
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Figure 1. Flow of Funds of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program 
Figure 2. Funding Sources of the FILP 
Figure 3. Share of Sources for the Trust Fund Bureau Fund 
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2.2. How Funds are Distributed through the Program 
Now, the means by which funds are allocated to various channels are described next. The 
FILP does not invest funds directly into particular projects, but rather provides funds to 
government institutions which actually invest or lend funds to private agents. There are sixty-
eight such government institutions to be counted thus far: among them the first category of 
institutions includes the Housing and Urban Development Corporation, Employment 
Promotion Corporation, Japan Railroad Corporation which was called Japan National Railroad 
before privatization, Japan Railroad Construction Corporation, and Japan Highway 
Corporation. They are mainly for the purpose of promoting public investment to build 
infrastructure for the economy. 
The second category of institutions include government financial institutions (financial 
intermediaries) such as the Japan Development Bank (JDB), the Export-Import Bank of Japan, 
Overseas Economic Corporation Fund, Small Business Finance Corporation, People's Finance 
Corporation, Housing Loan Corporation, and Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Finance 
Corporation. The JDB, for instance, has the role of financing public funds to promote 
industrial investment, and the Export-Import Bank of Japan finances funds for export and 
import. 
Local governments also require funding to improve their infrastructure such as roads, 
parks, and schools. For these purposes they issue bonds to finance projects. The FILP also 
purchases those bonds. Nearly more than half of those bonds issued by local governments are 
bought by the program. 
The particular objectives of investment by the FILP is classified into the following twelve 
categories; (1) housing, (2) maintaining national land and environment, (3) welfare, (4) 
education, (5) financing small businesses, (6) agriculture and fishery, (7) preventing natural 
disasters, (8) roads, (9) transportation and communication, (10) regional development, (11) 
industrial technology and (12) trade and overseas cooperation. We summarize the above 
categories into three major groups such as life-related (1-4), environment-related (7-10) and 
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industry-related (5,6,11, and 12). The trend of share of these three groups is shown in figure 
4. According to the figure, during the period of rapid growth, investment for industry-related 
purposes was considered the most important, followed by environment- and life-related 
investment. The life-related category began to show an increase after 1960.3) 
Figure 4. Trend of Share of the Three Major Category Groups 
2.3. Reasons for the FILP: Preliminary Discussion 
The reasons for government financial involvement is explained by market failure. In the 
financial market, imperfection occurs due to various reasons, and the market fails to achieve the 
efficiency of allocation. The inefficiency of the market system results mainly from the 
following two factors: imperfect information and imperfect competition. The former results in 
deficiencies in the market or the lack of complete contracts in the private sector, as Ide and 
Hayashi [1992] have suggested. It also leads to government provision of funds to risky areas, 
which gives less incentive to the private sector for investment (see Yoshino [1990]). The 
government and the private sector share the risk. 
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Imperfect competition stems from the monopolistic power of private financial institutions, 
which is due to the economies of scale, or economies of scope. Then the government either 
regulates the market to restore competitiveness, or acts as a countervailing power to suppress 
the monopolistic power of the private sector, and to promote fairness among agents (see 
Royama[1986]). 
Another view of government financial activities is to focus on achieving particular policy 
aims such as economic development. The government can supply long-term and low-risk 
capital to the market and can take the risk involved in investment by the tax scheme, for 
instance. These measures are known as industrial policy. In addition, according to Stiglitz 
[1991], nurturing the financial market is a policy objective of the government. 
Thus, government commitment to the financial market has the above function: on the 
other hand, it also has a negative effect on the economy. The optimal level of government 
intervention should therefore be considered. 
3. IS SUES ON THE SIZE AND FUNCTION OF THE FILP 
Here, a generalization as to how the level of government activities is determined is 
presented in abstract terms. By its application, how government activities change according 
to the economic environment will be examined. 
3.1. The Value of a Social System 
There is no doubt that the market mechanism is not perfect in terms of allocating 
resources. Where the market fails, the government enters as an important agent to restore its 
efficiency. In practice, however, it is difficult to determine the optimal size of such 
government activities. The general idea here can be explained as follows. An economic 
system is supposed to have as its social net value W. Let us suppose that W has the following 
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function form; 
6 stands for the degree of government activities, such as the number of regulations, the 
relative share of the government over the private sector, the size of government in terms of 
amount of budget or employees, etc Zi signifies the parameters which affect W, which will be 
explained in more detail later. Given values of parameters zj, the value of a social system 
depends upon the degree of government activities relative to those of the private sector. The 
optimal size of the government 0 * is therefore determined as the value which maximizes W. 
As Zj varies, 0 * also varies. 
Let us discuss the parameters z; in this context of the financial market, in which the FILP 
plays an important role. The important parameters are summarized as follows: (a) level of 
economic development, (b) degree of competition in the market, and (c) budget situation of the 
government. There are other factors such as social norm of the society, historical traditions, 
etc Here we restrict our focus only on those parameters mentioned above. 
3.2. Parameters which affect W 
In the early stage of economic development, suitable government policies can promote 
economic development. Well-known examples in the Japanese economy include an industrial 
policy which aimed at nurturing strategic industries by measures such as investing tax money, 
providing tax credit by special allowances for depreciation, and blocking foreign competition by 
setting up tariffs or non-tariff barriers. Construction of social infrastructure is also another 
government measure to promote economic development. As the economy grows, however, 
the market system takes over the role of resource allocation. Without government intervention, 
the economy grows under the market mechanism. Then the share of the government to the 
economy declines. 
The financial market is one of the most regulated areas in any economy, since the security 
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of the whole financial system is the basis for economic stability. Due to this, even competition 
itself is restricted. The number of regulations depends upon the degree of competitiveness of 
the market. In general, the more competitive the market, the less the government regulations. 
The globalization of the economy, or technical innovation of financial transactions, such as 
electric banking or "digi-cash or cyber-dollar" make regulations less effective. 
The philosophical attitude towards a budget system or government directly affects 
government size. Under an economy with a Keynesian tradition, for instance, the size of 
government tends to grow; under the influence of Classical economics, on the other hand, it 
becomes smaller. 
3.3. Comparative Static of zj in the Japanese Economy 
According to the above framework, in this section let us discuss how a parameter affects 
0*. As stated earlier, the FILP played a vital role in promoting economic development. 
The economic situation of LDCs are characterized by low capital accumulation, poor financial 
market, and poor technology. Here, the role of the government tends to grow by investing 
public funds for infrastructure, improving the financial market, and providing long-term capital 
necessary for economic growth. At this stage of development, the government sector has 
more information on technology, or industry with externality to the economy. The government 
can take the lead in reducing the risk of the private sector. This is referred to as risk-sharing 
between the government and the private sector. 
As an economy develops and the private sector accumulates capital, financial 
"deepening" or "widening" in terms of the market, financial commodity, or transactions occurs. 
The agents can then find ways to gain access to suitable funds in terms of amount, interest rates, 
maturity, and risk. They can also choose suitable items to invest in. In addition to these, the 
gap in the amount of information available between the government and the private sector 
becomes narrower. The advantage of government financing thus disappears and the market 
mechanism takes over. 
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The Japanese economy currently shows the biggest GDP per capita as well as the largest 
amount of family savings. The economy can manage without government intervention. 
3.4. Competitiveness of the Financial Market and Its Effect on the FILP 
In the financial market, individual households and small businesses sometimes have to 
deal with banks with monopolistic power, usually big banks. Government intervention in the 
financial market has the function of maintaining the competitiveness of the market. In this 
sense, as the market becomes more competitive, the less the role of government. 
Since the 1980s, deregulation of the financial market has been proceeding and now there 
is basically no regulation on interest rates. Let us examine the effect of deregulation on the 
FILP in more detail. In 1987, as part of deregulation, interest rates related to the FILP were 
also determined according to the market rates of interest.4) Particularly, the interest rate 
charged by the Trust Fund Bureau fund is related to long-term government bonds, and 
government financial institutions lend funds with rates based on the long-term prime interest 
rates. The difference between them is the profit margin for government financial institutions. 
When interest rates were regulated in the period of rapid growth in the 1960s, government 
financial institutions could secure about a 1.5% margin. It became 1% in the 1970s, and after 
deregulation, however, this margin became smaller, and even saw occasional reversals at certain 
phases of the business cycle, especially during periods of falling interest rates. The current 
movement of those interest rates is shown in figure 5. 
This causes a serious problem for government financial institutions because they are no 
longer guaranteed profits by the regulation. Let us examine how this affected the profit of 
government financial corporations, as shown in table 1. 
As for the function of government financial institutions which comprise the FILP, their 
roles are classified by the following two categories: (a) quantity complimentary, and (b) 
quality complimentary. The former role implies that they provide funds to agents who do not 
receive sufficient funds because they are considered too small or too risky, and thus are likely to 
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be rationed by private banks. Peoples' Finance Corporation, Small Business Finance 
Corporation, and Hokkaido-Tohoku Development Finance Corporation are examples. 
Basically they lend funds at the same rate as the market. 
Figure 5. Current Interest Rates 
The latter role implies that in order to practice particular policy goals, government 
financial institutions lend funds at a lower rate than market rates. Institutions which follow this 
function are, for instance, the Housing Loan Corporation, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 
Finance Corporation, and Environmental and Sanitation Business Finance Corporation. They 
provide funds at lower rates, and this means that they always suffer losses, and these losses are 
covered by the general account of the government budget. 
There is a relationship of common interest between the types of government financial 
institutions and subsidies from the general account. As for category (a), quantity 
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Table 1. Accounting of Major Government Financial Corporations 
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complimentary corporations, during periods of falling interest rates (1985-87, for instance), the 
difference between interest received and paid (row (D in table 1) tends to show an decrease; 
accordingly subsidies from the budget increase. This is due to the fact that they provide loans 
at the prime rate and borrow at the rate determined by the Trust Fund Bureau, which is the 
same as long-term government bonds. At phases of falling interest rates, especially in 1993 and 
1995 as indicated in figure 5, these two might be reversed. Another fact regarding 
institutions of this category is that recently their operational expenses have been increasing. 
Especially that of the People's Finance Corporation is greater than its net revenue of interest 
income, and this reveals the inefficiency of its management. 
On the other hand, as for institutions of category (b), their losses are not related to the 
cyclical situation of the financial market, and they have received an almost constant amount of 
interest subsidies from the general account for the past ten years. Among these institutions, 
the Housing Loan Corporation shows the biggest losses.5) As for the share of the government 
and private sector, the balance of the mortgage of the Housing Loan Corporation totals more 
than half, and this is oftentimes referred to as being symbolic of the government's efforts to 
drive out the private sector.6) This fuels doubt regarding public subsidies for housing, since it 
is much too costly in an age when a family is able to live in either a private home or apartment. 
In addition, it gives rise to the fairness issue between homeowners and renters. 
According to table 1, these eight major government financial corporations received 
¥560 billion worth of subsidies from the general account. In comparison with those received 
in 1980, the People's Finance Corporation and Small Business Corporation showed a tenfold 
increase, and the Housing Loan Corporation doubled their subsidies. 
3.5. Budget Deficit and the FILP 
Following the oil crisis, the government has had to issue a huge amount of bonds in order 
to cope with the resulting recession, and it will amount to ¥220 trillion at the end of the 1995 
fiscal year. The amount of bonds issued will be close to half of the GDP. The FILP is also 
involved in the issuance of bonds, since the Trust Fund Bureau has had a big demand for 
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government bonds. Particularly since the second oil crisis of 1980, it had increased the 
purchase of government bonds which totaled one third of newly issued bonds in the 1980s. As 
a result, in 1994, it owned ¥83 trillion worth, and more than one third of the bonds are owned 
by the Trust Fund Bureau. 
This gives rise to serious budgetary problems as well as others for the FILP itself. First, 
since the FILP purchases government bonds, this enables the government to increase the budget 
deficit rather easily, and it is said that an increase of the budget deficit absorbs the resources 
available to the private sector. This problem is also related to the FILP, since the source of 
funds to the FILP is the voluntary savings of households and the FILP must pay interest. The 
aims of the FILP are to allocate funds to areas which are socially necessary but neglected by the 
market mechanism. Bond purchase, however, implies financing the government deficit and 
this is opposite from its aims. In addition to this, it claims that the FILP provides funds to the 
Japanese Railway Settlement Corporation and to special accounts such as national forestry 
areas, national universities, and national hospitals. These are all losing money, and it is not 
appropriate for the FILP to provide them funds which are supposed to be invested in profitable 
projects. In sum, the FILP takes over roles that should actually be covered by the budget. 
Second, the Trust Fund Bureau is a part of the Ministry of Finance, and thus, the 
Ministry of Finance plays dual roles; one is issuing bonds, and the other is purchasing them. 
Thus, the Ministry loses control over its expenditures, making it difficult to maintain a balanced 
budget. Another related issue regarding the dual role the Ministry of Finance is the moral 
hazard. As an actor of bond purchase, the Trust Fund Bureau invests short-term funds in the 
bond market. Even if the amount is small, this operation has an announcement effect on the 
market. On the other hand, as an actor of bond issuance, the Ministry of Finance has the 
incentive to sell at a lower rate than the interest rate being paid. It is said that the Trust Fund 
Bureau tries to maintain bond prices in order to reduce the burden of issuing new government 
bonds. This exactly is the moral hazard. 
All activities of the Trust Fund Bureau are required to receive Diet approval. However, 
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loans of less than five years are exceptions to the rule. This leads to the Bureau making use of 
short-term transactions to cover the deficits of the special accounts.7) 
4. SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES OF THE FILP 
Here some socioeconomic basis of the FILP is provided to discuss the role of the 
government in the FILP. 
4.1. The FILP and the Principal-Agent Relationship 
There are many agents related to the FILP. As stated earlier, the fund flows from 
households to postal savings, from there to the Trust Fund Bureau, and then to government 
financial institutions and on to the final demanders of the fund such as the private sector, or 
local governments. The efficiency of the FILP system depends upon how these agents can be 
integrated. One explanation for this issue is the principal-agent relationship (see Ide and 
Hayashi [1992]). Care should be taken when applying this theory to the FILP. The usual 
principal-agent relationship can be found, for instance, between stockholders and the 
management of firms, or between depositors and banks in the financial market. The FILP, 
however, is not comprised of simple relationships. There are many independent agents in the 
FILP; that is, it consists of multi-layered relationships. At the first stage of the flow of the 
fund, depositors of postal savings are the principal, and the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications is the agent. At the second stage, however, the Ministry is the principal, 
and the Trust Fund Bureau is the agent. And at the third stage, the Bureau is the principal, 
and the government corporations or government financial institutions are agents. In some 
cases, a fourth stage implies that government financial institutions such as the People's Finance 
Corporation, and Small Business Finance Corporation are principals, and private banks are 
agents under a consignment contract.8) 
Thus, we should be careful when applying the single stage principal-agent theory to the 
FILP. If we take a particular stage of the principal-agent relationship, and can explain its 
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efficiency over the private banks in the financial market, this does not necessarily guarantee the 
efficiency of the entire system. A typical example is found in the issue of mismatch in the 
demand and supply of the fund. All projects of the FILP are determined according to the same 
mechanism as the budget. This implies that projects deemed necessary for the economy are 
determined at the beginning of the fiscal year as part of the general budget, then the decision as 
to how they will be financed follows. This comes from the concept of ex-ante. In ex-post, 
however, they are not always realized. During the fiscal year, the situation might differ from 
what had been expected. If more money is deposited into the postal savings, and if the agents 
of the FILP do not dispose of the increased funds, it is carried over to the next fiscal year. 
This is the problem of carry-over, which occurs because the extra funds are disposed of 
according to the budget system. There is no mechanism to rectify the mismatch of the demand 
and supply of the fund. As shown in this example, there is no consistent contract among the 
agents of the whole FILP, and only the consequences of bureaucratic inflexibility remains. 
The FILP system appears to work efficiently since the program collects public funds from all 
sources and integrates them, and then invests in public projects in a consistent manner. This 
integration seems to practice the economy of scale yet, on the other hand, it causes x-efficiency 
and a mismatch of the fund, since there is no optimal contract throughout the various stages of 
the FILP. 
In order to consider this problem in more concrete terms, let us compare the Toyota 
production system as another example of the multi-layered principal-agent relationship. In the 
Toyota system, Toyota Motor Corporation is the single and ultimate principal in the whole 
system and it can make the optimal contract with other agents. According to Coase[1937] 
and Williamson[1989], the optimal length of the stages in this context is determined by either 
the transaction costs or information structure of the system to prevent opportunism and 
bounded rationality. It is possible for Toyota to determine this. As for the monitoring 
scheme, Toyota can easily check the quality of parts and this enables Toyota to continuously 
supervise these parts suppliers. Since all parts are manufactured by its primary, secondary, 
and tertiary subcontractors, this determines the quality of Toyota automobiles. On the other 
hand, the reason why its more than 34,000 subcontractors maintain the hierarchical production 
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system is either due to "growth-sharing," that is, when Toyota grows, they also grow, or risk-
sharing. This is one of the incentive constraints for the subcontractors. Another scheme of 
the Toyota system is found in its joint activities such as R&D to seek out new technology and 
new methods of manufacturing. 
In the FILP system, on the other hand, there is no single ultimate principal such as 
Toyota. The Ministry of Finance cannot act like Toyota, nor enforce an optimal contract on 
behalf of the FILP, since it is one section of the administration. In addition, they are all public 
agents or corporations of which behavior is not profit maximization, and contracts are 
determined by political decision-making. The only possible motivation for the FILP is that it is 
part of the government administration. Yet, there is less incentive to be efficient, thus x-
efficiency occurs.9) As for the monitoring of agents, all information is not necessarily revealed 
in their financial reports, since they are under a different accounting system from the private 
sector. 
4.2. Bureaucratical Sectionalism and the FILP 
Another inefficiency in the FILP reveals itself because of the sectionalism of the 
bureaucracy. In the program more than one government agent pursues the same goal. 
Housing, for instance, is the most urgent issue for achieving the national goal of a high quality 
of life. The Housing and Urban Development Corporation, Housing Loan Corporation, Japan 
Workers' Housing Association, and even the Employment Promotion Corporation engage in 
either construction or mortgage financing. This is a typical ill effect of the bureaucracy, which 
leads to inefficiency. In this sense, the integration of government corporations with similar 
activities is quite persuasive. 
This kind of sectionalism has another function, that is, competition among government 
agencies, and in some circumstances the consequences are favorable. In the FILP, the Ministry 
of Finance does not necessarily play a dominant role. Many government corporations belong 
to other ministries. The JDB, Export-Import Bank of Japan, and Small Business Finance 
Corporation are affiliated with MITI, the Japan Highway Corporation, and Housing and Urban 
18 
Development Corporation with the Ministry of Construction, and the Environmental Sanitation 
Business Financing Corporation with the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Bureaucrats are 
said to be eager to expand their power to related areas of their administration, as indicated by 
Niskanen [1971], who formulated the hypothesis that bureaucrats maximize the budget under 
their control. This is what motivates the competitive atmosphere among government 
ministries. Once their territories of administration are secured, however, their interests go in 
the opposite direction, that is, "backwards". Many suggest that the cowbell effect of the FILP 
is just a myth, but it actually provided trillions of yen to declining industries such as those 
related to coal, agriculture and forestry, and sea transport.10) The situation differs greatly 
when they look to the future. Now, targeting forward to the information society of the 21st 
century, bureaucrats are announcing their own projects in the information industry. MITI, the 
Ministries of Construction, Agriculture, Transportation, and even the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications have formulated ambitious projects. In addition to supporting 
information or computer industries, funding is also being provided to venture businesses. 
Even the Ministry of Education has joined this race. This attitude of claiming new territory 
has the same basis as the government role in implementing an industrial policy for economic 
development. 
5. TOWARDS THE REFORM OF THE FILP 
We discussed thus far the role of the government in the context of the FILP. The 
system of the FILP has not been able to adjust well to the new circumstances of the economy. 
The transformation taking place in the Japanese economy such as low growth, globalization, 
aging economy, and market competition has had a positive effect in changing the role of the 
government in the economy. The turn to a low growth economy implies that the savings rate 
will decline. An aging economy means that accumulated pension funds will be withdrawn. 
Deregulation in the financial market will lead to diminishing the advantage of postal savings. 
The consequences of these changes mean a decrease in sources of funding for the FILP. As 
shown in figure 3, among the sources of the Trust Fund Bureau fund, other factors aside from 
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postal savings and national and welfare pensions are increasing, which include payment of past 
loans. In future, this phenomena will continue. The basis of the FILP, which depends upon 
the growth of the Japanese economy, will suffer collapse at the funding source. 
One way to cope with this problem is to trim down the public sector and to introduce the 
market mechanism to the FILP. Some of the institutions of the FILP, especially the 
government financial corporations, can operate under the market as private agents. As 
pointed out earlier by the example of the inefficiency of the multi-layered agency relationship, 
there should be single stage relationship and more freedom given to management to collect 
funds from the market in a competitive manner. This implies that they should be able to issue 
their own securities and postal savings can purchase them. Postal savings would thus become 
an independent agent to collect and invest its own funds. An integrated system which follows 
the directions of single agents such as the Ministry of Finance or other non-market agents is not 
suitable in an economy which is much more volatile. 
Other suggested reforms are as follows: (a) introducing a business accounting system 
other than that of public firms, (b) revealing more information, and (c) separating the budget 
and financial function in the FILP. An example of (b) is, for instance, information on the 
behavior of the Trust Fund Bureau such as the usage of short-term funds of less than five years 
which do not require Diet approval, and the amount of its open market operation of 
government bonds. As for the former it has been previously mentioned that the funds are 
being used to make up for deficits of special accounts. Since the FILP fund must pay interest, 
it should be invested in profitable projects. 
Most of the reforms suggest the introduction the market mechanism into the FILP and 
the dismantling of the program in such a way as to provide more freedom to the agencies in the 
FILP. Postal savings, which has the sole operation of accepting deposits, can lend or invest its 
own fund by its own decision, and this enables the postal savings to be a complete financial 
institution. Other government institutions should be permitted to issue their own bonds to 
collect funds through the market, and the Trust Fund Bureau can become an agent to purchase 
those bonds. Competition in the market would make the FILP more efficient. This is the 
only way to coordinate the merits of the FILP and promote its efficiency. 
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NOTES 
1) The definition of the FILP differs according to author. The definition provided here is one 
of the broadest. This broad definition is sometimes referred to as public financing or policy 
implementing financing. We will not go into the semantics of the FILP any further. 
2) The Trust Fund Bureau is part of the Finance Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. It is said 
that the Bureau is operated by less than thirty people. 
3) The function of the FILP project in different periods of the post-war Japanese economy as 
well as the motivation of the policy makers are analyzed in Tsuji [1992]. 
4) At the same time, the postal savings and welfare pension funds were allowed to invest their 
own funds. This, in principle, broke the rule of the unification of funds under the Trust Fund 
Bureau. In 1995, postal savings totaled about ¥40 trillion. But they are supposed to hold only 
government bonds. 
5) Housing has been the major objective of the fiscal policy after the bubble economy. This 
caused the recent increase in the share of the Housing Loan Corporation in mortgages. The 
increase of operating expenses can be partly explained by this, and another reason is that there 
is a time lag in changing their interest rates according to those of the market. The Housing Loan 
Corporation, People's Finance Corporation, and Small Business Finance Corporation are 
operating with private banks under consignment. Inflexibility in changing the consignment fee 
is also a possible reason for their losses, as pointed out by Hayashi [1987], who provides an 
interesting analysis of the consignment of the Small Business Finance Corporation. 
6) Now private banks offer lower rates of mortgage than the Housing Loan Corporation. 
This is again due to the inflexibility of its mortgage rates. 
7) Because of the long recession, local government budgets have worsened, and they borrow 
from the local allocation tax special account. The general account of the national budget itself 
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is suffering a deficit. Thus, the special account borrows from the FILP. In 1994, loans 
amounted to ¥26 trillion. This is another example of the general account making use of the 
FILP fund to make up for its deficit. 
8) Other governments have similar programs for funding public projects, for example, 
National Loans Fund in the UK, and Federal Credit Program in the US. They do not have a 
complicated system like the FILP, nor are they multi-layered. 
9) Because of the increase of repayment, it is said that some government financial institutions 
may choose either the FILP fund or repayment, and they prefer funds with a lower cost. If this 
is true, they are then showing some kind of maximizing behavior, and might cause the carry-
over of the FILP fund. 
10) See Horiuchi and Otaki [1987]. There are lots of empirical studies about the cowbell 
effect of the FILP fund, with special focus on the JDB. The origin of the idea is found in 
Higano[1984]. 
11) For instance, see Royama [1986], and Hayashi [1987]. 
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